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argues against, the adoption of the Restatement (Third)'s
reasonable alternative design standard and the rejection of
the Restatement (Second)'s consumer expectations test in
the hypothetical State of Hutchins. The authors discuss the
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Bowbeer, Cavanaugh, and Stewart rely upon precedent
from other jurisdictions, one hypothetical Hutchins case,
and various policy arguments advanced in the delibera-
tions about adopting the new Restatement. In addition to
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concrete and specific illustration of how arguments for and
against the application of the reasonable alternative design
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the Hutchins Court of Appeals on Defendant's interlocutory
appeal (permitted under the State of Hutchins Rules of
Civil Appellate Procedure) from the district court's denial
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. In a products liability action based upon an alleged
design defect, should Plaintiff be required to prove
that a reasonable alternative design existed that
would have made the product safer overall, and
that omitting that alternative design in the subject
product made the product not reasonably safe?
The district court answered in the negative.
II. Is Defendant entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs design defect claim where Plaintiff of-
fered evidence of alternative designs but failed to
show that the proposed alternatives would have
offered consumers the same advantages as Defen-
dant's design, and that they would have made the'
product safer overall?
The district court answered in the negative.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on July 12,
1995, while ten-year-old Plaintiff Timmy Tumble was riding
a Cascade Dirt Warrior mountain bike on an off-road trail. As
Plaintiff attempted to jump a three-foot dirt mound, a spring
in the Dirt Warrior's suspension fork broke, allowing the
suspension to "bottom out." Although the fork itself remained
intact and fully functional, Plaintiff lost control and fell off the
bicycle, sustaining serious injuries.
Following the accident, Plaintiff brought this products lia-
bility action against Defendant Cascade Bicycle Company
(Cascade), the manufacturer of the bicycle, alleging that defects
in the suspension system of the Dirt Warrior caused the
accident.
Plaintiffs parents purchased the Dirt Warrior mountain bike
for $149 at Discount-Mart, a national discount superstore. The
Dirt Warrior is an inexpensive bicycle that can be purchased
only in discount stores. Although inexpensive, the Dirt Warrior
mountain bike is the only bicycle in its price class to incorpo-
rate a mechanical suspension in the front fork to provide added
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shock absorption and better rider control. The fork, which uses
steel springs as the suspension component, was designed to
continue to perform without mechanical suspension (like the
fork of an ordinary bicycle) if the suspension "bottomed out"
because the springs either fully compressed or broke.
Higher-end mountain bikes cost $400 or more. These high-
end bicycles use chromium-molybdenum forks and an oil-based
elastomer mechanical suspension system. Plaintiffs toy expert
opined that steel springs are unsuitable for off-road use and
that an oil-based elastomer mechanical suspension system
would not have fractured under the circumstances of Plaintiff's
accident. Cascade's president testified, however, that if Cascade
were to use an oil-based elastomer suspension fork on the Dirt
Warrior the company would have to raise the price of the
bicycle by at least $75 to meet increased production and
material costs. Cascade's market research showed that Dirt
Warrior consumers would be unwilling or unable to purchase
the bicycle if Cascade raised the price by as little as $20.
Cascade's market research also revealed that customers
generally understood that lower-priced bicycles like the Dirt
Warrior have limited features. Uncontroverted testimony also
established that the more complex oil-based elastomer system
would require more frequent and more difficult maintenance
than the suspension system used on the Dirt Warrior.
Plaintiff also proffered another design that he claims would
have prevented the accident, an alternative which was em-
ployed by a small bicycle maker in Colorado. An engineer from
that maker acknowledged, however, that the company had not
attempted to incorporate its design into the Dirt Warrior con-
figuration and that this design could interfere with the oper-
ation of other Dirt Warrior components. Furthermore, the
Colorado design has never been incorporated successfully into
a mass-produced bicycle.
The Dirt Warrior came with an owner's manual, which
Plaintiffs father reviewed with Plaintiff before he first rode the
bicycle. The manual describes the components and features of
the bicycle and instructs the user on proper maintenance. The
manual specifically recommends against using the Dirt Warrior
for jumping. Cascade does not advertise the Dirt Warrior in
any of its print or television advertisements.
Plaintiff alleges that the design of the Dirt Warrior was
defective because its mechanical suspension used steel springs
instead of an oil-based elastomer system or the Colorado
design. Upon completion of discovery, Cascade moved for
partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs design defect claim
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because Plaintiff had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of a
reasonable alternative design in accordance with section 2(b)
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1995) (hereinafter Restatement (Third)). The
district court declined to apply the Restatement (Third) stan-
dard, ruling that prior Hutchins case law did not require proof
of a reasonable alternative design. The court further ruled that
even if the Restatement (Third) applied, Plaintiff had produced
sufficient evidence to create a jury question and survive
Cascade's motion.
The district court, however, certified the questions presented
by Cascade's motion as important and doubtful, paving the way
for this interlocutory appeal.'
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Twenty-five years ago, this Court embraced section 402A of
the American Law Institute's (ALI) Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1965) (hereinafter Restatement (Second)) and held a
manufacturer liable for injuries caused by its product if the
product was in a defective condition that rendered it unrea-
sonably dangerous to the consumer. See Taylor v. Binford
Tools, Inc., 123 Hut. 59, 62 (1971). Citing comment i to section
402A, this Court further held that an objective standard-that
of the "reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer"-is
to be used in determining whether a product is "unreasonably
dangerous." Id. at 63.
Over the years, however, it has become increasingly apparent
that the "reasonable consumer expectations" test, without
more, does not offer an adequate template for analyzing design
defect claims. A number of courts and commentators, and now
the ALI itself, have concluded that where a claim concerns the
design of the product (rather than some flaw in its manufac-
ture), the jury must consider the risks and benefits of the
challenged design and determine whether the manufacturer
adopted a reasonable design in light of the available alterna-
tives. See Restatement (Third) § 2 & cmt. c, reporters' note
1. Plaintiff's complaint also included a claim for failure to warn. Cascade's
motion did not seek summary judgment on that claim, and therefore it is not a subject
of this interlocutory appeal.
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cmt. c. By implication, therefore, a design defect claim must
fail if the plaintiff cannot prove that a reasonable alternative
design existed that would have improved the overall safety of
the product without significantly compromising or detracting
from its utility, performance, economy, or other benefits to the
ordinary consumer.
This approach, which has been incorporated explicitly into
section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third), does not represent a
radical departure from Hutchins case law. On the contrary, it
represents the most principled basis upon which to assess
"reasonable expectations." A consumer, after all, most reason-
ably expects that the product manufacturer will strike a
reasonable balance among competing design considerations in
light of the available design alternatives. Accordingly, the
district court erred in holding that Hutchins law does not
require Plaintiff to prove a reasonable alternative design. It
further erred in concluding that Plaintiffs evidence established
the existence of a reasonable alternative design rendering the
Dirt Warrior defective and unreasonably dangerous.
ARGUMENT
I. IN A DESIGN DEFECT CASE, PLAINTIFF
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT A
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN EXISTED
THAT WOULD HAVE MADE THE PRODUCT
SAFER OVERALL AND THAT THE FAILURE TO
USE THE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN MADE THE
PRODUCT NOT REASONABLY SAFE.
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) charts a carefully
considered course for resolving design defect claims, stating
that
a product is defective in design when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor
in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reason-
ably safe[.]
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In comment c the Reporters elaborate: "[Tihe test is whether
a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design
rendered the product not reasonably safe." Restatement (Third)
§ 2 cmt. c. Thus, under section 2(b), a plaintiff alleging a
design defect cannot establish a prima facie case without
showing that a reasonable alternative design existed that not
only would have reduced or prevented the plaintiffs injury but
that also would have made the product safer overall. See id.
cmt. e.
Significantly, however, proof of a reasonable alternative
design, while necessary, is not alone sufficient to establish
liability under section 2(b). Recognizing that the existence of
a safer alternative does not by itself mean that the manufac-
turer chose to use an unreasonable design, section 2(b) further
requires a plaintiff to show that without the proposed alter-
native design the product was "not reasonably safe." In this
respect, section 2(b) emphasizes that a product manufacturer
does not have a duty to design the safest possible product. See
e.g., Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 338 (4th Cir.
1991) (opining that "the fact that as of the time of trial [an
expert] was able to develop a prototype using technology
available to Bell in 1979 does not lead to the conclusion that
the design of the Bell Star III helmet was defective"); Hart v.
Hytrol Conveyor Co., 823 F. Supp. 87, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(stating that "even if vulcanization was available in 1977, there
is no requirement that a manufacturer make the safest or best
product, it is only necessary that it sells a product that is
reasonably safe" (citations omitted)). As the Tennessee Court
of Appeals wisely observed:
"A manufacturer ... is not an insurer of the product he
designs, and it is not required that the design adopted be
perfect, or render the product accident proof, or incapable
of causing injury, nor is it necessary to incorporate the
ultimate safety features in the product. Hence, a departure
from the required standard of care is not demonstrated
where it is simply shown that there was a better, safer, or
different design which would have averted the injury."
Totty v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7994, at 16,217 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
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19, 1977) (quoting 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 21 (Supp.
1975)) (alteration in original).
Just as a manufacturer must consider a number of factors
in designing a product, the finder of fact in a design defect case
must consider whether those factors, on balance, allowed for
use of another design and whether the product was reasonably
safe even if it did not incorporate that alternative. The perti-
nent factors include the magnitude of the foreseeable risks of
harm; the consumer expectations regarding the product; and
the effects of the alternative design on utility, ease of use,
production costs, maintenance and repair, marketability, and
safety. See Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. e.
As the following discussion will demonstrate, the district
court erred in declining to apply the standard embodied in
section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) to assess Plaintiff's
design defect claim, not because it appears in a Restatement,
but because it conforms with the law of Hutchins and other
jurisdictions and makes good sense. If a consumer expects a
manufacturer to weigh all competing factors in selecting a
design among various alternatives, then section 2(b), including
its reasonable alternative design requirement, is entirely
consistent with Hutchins' approach to design defect cases. On
the other hand, if the consumer expectations standard means
nothing more than consumer beliefs divorced from consider-
ation of competing design and product performance require-
ments, then that standard fails as a meaningful or realistic
basis for evaluating product design claims, and Hutchins
should follow the lead of the numerous other courts that have
discarded it as the dispositive standard for design defect.
A. Plaintiff Cannot Prove that a Product's De-
sign Violated the Reasonable Expectations
of the Ordinary Consumer Without Proof of
a Reasonable Alternative Design.
1. As an Objective Test, the Consumer Expectations
Standard Requires the Jury to Consider the Bal-
ance of Product Uses and Risks Struck by the
Manufacturer in Selecting the Design of Its
Product.
Hutchins follows the doctrine of strict liability in tort as set
forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second). See Taylo
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v. Binford Tools, Inc., 123 Hut. 59, 62 (1971). Section 402A
requires a plaintiff to prove a defect in the design or manu-
facture of a product that makes the product unreasonably
dangerous for its intended use. See Restatement (Second)
§ 402A cmt. g (1965). In determining whether a product is
"defective" under section 402A, Hutchins traditionally has
applied the consumer expectations test. In other words, "The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchas-
es it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics." Id. § 402A cmt. i.
The section 402A requirement that the product be "unreason-
ably dangerous," rather than merely "dangerous," is a critical
one. Because every product can be dangerous to some extent,
a test predicating liability on the "dangerous" rather than the
"unreasonably dangerous" design of a product would impose
absolute liability for any injury caused by a product and
transform manufacturers into insurers, a result that numerous
courts have explicitly rejected. See Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car
Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1991) ("A manufacturer is
not an insurer of all injuries stemming from the use of its
products.... ."); Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331,336
(4th Cir. 1991) ("[Manufacturers are not insurers against all
injury involving their products."); Neal v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
823 F. Supp. 939, 941 (N.D. Ga. 1993) ("[A] manufacturer does
not act as an insurer with respect to product design .. ..
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Mich. 1984)
("[Clourts ... have never gone so far as to make sellers insur-
ers of their products . . . ."); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988) ("[Ilmposing liability
on manufacturers for unknowable dangers would make them
virtual insurers of their products."); Glassey v. Continental Ins.
Co., 500 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Wis. 1993) ("Strict liability does not
make the manufacturer.. . an insurer. . . ."). Thus, any test
of "unreasonable danger" must include the full spectrum of a
product's features-including its risks, price, economy, utility,
comfort, convenience, aesthetics, and durability. See Aller v.
Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co.. Inc., 268 N.W.2d 830,835 (Iowa 1978)
("Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing process. On
one side of the scale is the utility of the product and on the
other is the risk of its use."); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
326 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Mich. 1982) ("[Tlhe design of a product
is the result of many interrelated considerations, of which
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safety is but one. Any determination of the reasonableness of
the design of a product is essentially an inquiry as to whether
safety under a variety of conditions was given sufficient con-
sideration.").
Accordingly, this Court has recognized that strict liability for
a design defect must turn on an objective standard, rather than
a test that might permit juries, based on their own idiosyncrat-
ic views of dangerousness, to impose liability inconsistently.
Operating in tandem with the "defective condition" require-
ment, the "unreasonably dangerous" component of the section
402A calculus demands that juries base their liability determi-
nations on the ordinary consumer's reasonable expectation that
products sold to the public will neither be risk-free nor incorpo-
rate all possible safety devices, but will provide a reasonable
balance of all of the various features that the diverse buying
public seeks or desires in its products. In that analysis, jurors
must put aside their subjective preferences and determine
instead whether the product's design reflects a reasonable
combination of function, risk, price, utility, comfort, conve-
nience, aesthetics, durability, and other features of interest to
the consumer, even if other combinations might also have been
reasonable.
Many jurisdictions using the consumer expectations test for
defective design cases emphasize the "reasonableness" of the
consumer's expectations and the importance of balancing all
the product's features in determining whether the ordinary
consumer's reasonable expectations have been met. See Lamkin
v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 458 (Ill. 1990) ("A consumer may
rightfully expect a product to safely do the job for which it was
built or for a foreseeable similar use, but neither a retailer nor
a manufacturer can be held strictly liable for injuries resulting
from the misuse of its product."); Aller, 268 N.W.2d at 835
("Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing process. On
one side of the scale is the utility of the product and on the
other is the risk of its use."); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.,
727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) ("While usually called a 'con-
sumer expectations' test, the ... rule actually combines the
consideration of consumer expectations with an analysis of the
risk and utility inherent in a product's use."); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) ("In
determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative
cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the
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claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk may be relevant. .. ").
That a plaintiff may not simply challenge the design of a
product in the abstract follows from the interplay between
reasonable consumer expectations and reasonable product
feature balances. To prove that a product contains a defective
and unreasonably dangerous condition, a plaintiff must show
that at the time of manufacture a technologically feasible
alternative design existed that would have offered improved
overall safety, without significantly compromising its economy,
performance, utility, or other attributes of importance to the
ordinary consumer.
2. Proof of a Reasonable Alternative Design Is an Integral
Part of Proof that a Product Violated the Reasonable
Expectations of the Ordinary Consumer.
A number of courts analyzing the plaintiffs burden of proof
under section 402A and the "reasonable consumer expectation"
test have recognized that proof of the existence of a reasonable
alternative design is an integral element of the plaintiffs case.
See Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("To allege that a manufacturer breached its duty
to design a safe product under strict liability, a claimant must
offer a safer, more practicable product design than the design
in question."); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th
Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe district judge did not err in holding that the
plaintiff did bear the burden of showing that an alternative,
safer design, practicable under the circumstances, was avail-
able . . . ."); Pree v. Brunswick Corp., 983 F.2d 863, 867 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("[A]Ithough [plaintiff] forcefully argued that [defen-
dant] could have employed a safer alternative design for their
propellors, there was no evidence that such a design existed
.... ); Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works. Inc., 910
F.2d 167, 183 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[Plaintiff] was required to
present evidence ... that the risk avoided by the alternative
design outweighed the burden of adopting that design."); Elliott
v. Brunswick Corp., 903 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990);
("[Plaintiff] ... failed to produce evidence that [defendant] had
access to a safe, practical [alternative] design ... at the time
of her accident."); Lamkin, 563 N.E.2d at 458. ("Appellees fail
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to provide evidence of how the window screens' design could
have been altered to create a safer screen ... or any evidence
of the form and feasibility of the alternative design.")
Still other courts, although declining to state an all-
encompassing rule, have held that ordinarily the plaintiff must
prove a feasible alternative design to prevail on a design defect
claim. This requirement is particularly important where, as
here, the plaintiffs design defect case is predicated expressly
on the ground that the defendant should have incorporated a
particular safety feature into the product. See. e.g., Francis v.
Clark Equip. Co., 993 F.2d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying
Ohio's consumer expectations standard). In Francis, the
plaintiff argued that forklifts should be equipped with operator
restraint systems to prevent injury in the event of lateral over-
turns. The court replied:
Not every forklift accident is caused by a lateral overturn,
and, therefore.. . the jury must also consider the feasibili-
ty and effectiveness of seat belts in light of other accidents
that can occur in forklifts .... Whether under a consumer
expectation theory of liability or under a risk-benefit theory
of liability, the reasonableness of the proposed alternative
design in light of all forklift accidents is an element of
plaintiffs proof that the lack of operator restraints was a
design defect.
Id. at 551-52; see also Connor v. Skagit Corp., 664 P.2d 1208,
1212-13 (Wash. 1983) (noting that where plaintiff claims a
product defect based upon the existence of alternative designs,
plaintiff has the burden of proving the availability of a safer
design).
That the plaintiff must prove the existence of a reasonable
alternative design follows logically from section 402A. As the
court observed in Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d
1217 (1st Cir. 1990), "It is illogical to say that a product is
defective in its generic form when 'defect' has historically been
measured in reference to the availability, or at least the
feasibility, of safer alternatives." Id. at 1225. Particularly
where the case involves a product that consumers have pur-
chased and used for years, the consumer cannot reasonably
expect it to incorporate design features that are not techno-
logically and economically feasible, that would not make the
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product safer overall, or that would impair the product attrib-
utes that drew the consumer to the product in the first place.
To require proof of a reasonable alternative design is also
consistent with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions
applying the consumer expectations standard as well as other
tests of design defect. As the Reporters of the Restatement
(Third) emphasize, "Very substantial authority supports the
proposition that plaintiff must establish a reasonable alterna-
tive design in order for a product to be adjudged defective in
design." Restatement (Third) § 2 reporters' note cmt. c, at 50;
see also Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp., 21 F.3d 1048, 1056
(11th Cir. 1994) ("To prove defectiveness ... plaintiff must
prove that a safer, practical, alternative design was available
to the manufacturer at the time it manufactured its product."),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995); Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825
F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A] manufacturer is strictly
liable for damage caused by his product if there was a feasible
way to design a safer product and an ordinary consumer would
conclude that the manufacturer ought to have used that
alternative design."); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.
2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985) ("In order to prove defectiveness, the
plaintiff must prove that a safer, practical, alternative design
was available to the manufacturer. . . ."); Nacci v. Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 325 A.2d 617, 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) ("[T]he
proper test is whether the design has created a risk of harm
which is so probable that an ordinarily prudent person, acting
as a manufacturer, would pursue a different available design
which would substantially lessen the probability of harm.");
Owens, 326 N.W.2d at 379 ("[T]here is no data or other factual
evidence concerning the magnitude of the risks involved, [or]
the utility or relative safety of the proposed alternatives .... );
Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269, 1271 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994) ("[U]nless ... the risks in a product's use
outweigh its utility even though there is no reasonably feasible
alternative design, a plaintiff . . . is required to show the
existence of'a safe and reasonably feasible alternative to [the]
defendant's product.'" (citation omitted) (last alteration in
original)); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204,
208 (N.Y. 1983) ("The plaintiff.., is under an obligation to
present evidence that the product, as designed, was not reason-
ably safe ... and [that] it was feasible to design the product
in a safer manner.").
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In short, a plaintiff cannot prove that an allegedly defective
design violated reasonable expectations without proving that
an alternative design existed that would have made the prod-
uct safer while meeting the consumer demands, needs, and
preferences served by the challenged product. This funda-
mental principle is underscored in the instant case, in which
Plaintiffs attack on the Cascade Dirt Warrior is premised
expressly upon his claim that the use of steel springs rather
than some other suspension component in the front fork
constituted a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition.
Without specific proof that there is a reasonable alternative to
the steel springs, a jury has no principled basis upon which to
find the steel spring system either defective or unreasonably
dangerous. Thus, in holding that Plaintiff need not prove the
existence of a reasonable alternative design as articulated in
section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third), the district court
misapplied Hutchins law and ignored well-reasoned decisions
from many other jurisdictions as well as sound policy consider-
ations.
B. This Court Should Follow the Lead of Most
Courts and Commentators by Replacing the Con-
sumer Expectations Test with the Design Defect
Standard Contained in the Restatement (Third).
1. Most Courts and Commentators Have Set Aside
the Consumer Expectations Test in Favor of a
Standard that More Clearly Provides for the Anal-
ysis of the Risks and Benefits of the Challenged
Design and Proposed Design Alternatives.
Recognizing that the only principled construction of the
"reasonable consumer expectations" standard in a design defect
case requires proof of a reasonable alternative design, but
finding the consumer expectations test too imprecise in its
statement of that principle, many courts have instead adopted
the risk-utility standard as reflected in the Restatement
(Third). See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 186
(Mich. 1984) ("Thus we adopt, forthrightly, a pure negligence,
risk-utility test in products liability actions against manufac-
turers of products, where liability is predicated upon defective
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design."); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256
(Miss. 1993) (rejecting consumer expectations test and adopting
risk-utility test exclusively, stating that a" 'risk utility' analy-
sis best protects both the manufacturer and the consumer."
(citation omitted)); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806,
809 (Or. 1967) (explaining difficulties inherent in applying
consumer expectation test in design cases); see also 3 American
Law of Products Liability § 28:11 (1987) ("Today, the over-
whelming consensus among courts deciding design defect cases
is to use some form of risk-utility analysis.").
Even the California Supreme Court, a long-time champion
of the consumer expectations test, now has restricted the test's
use to those rare cases in which experience alone would provide
the ordinary consumer with an understanding of how much
safety the product at issue should provide. See Soule v. Gener-
al Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308-09 (Cal. 1994).2 In all other
cases, California courts apply the risk-utility test to determine
whether the product is defectively designed. See id.
Legal scholars have been as vocal as the courts in con-
demning the consumer expectations test as "unworkable" and
"impossible" to use in design defect cases. One commentator
has explained the problems as follows:
Few courts adhere closely to the letter of section 402A's
consumer expectations test in proving design defect. The
test has proved unworkable for a variety of reasons. First,
it connotes a contract-based liability, encouraging the jury
to rely intuitively on principles of bargaining and warranty.
Second, if the product contains a defect which is apparent
or obvious, the consumer's expectations arguably include
the apparent danger, preventing liability and therefore
discouraging product improvements which could easily and
cost-effectively alleviate the danger. Third, bystanders, who
are widely recognized as protected by both tort and contract
theories of products liability regardless of privity, cannot
be said to have any expectations about a product which
causes them injury.
Perhaps the most important criticism of the consumer
expectations test as it relates to design defects is the
2. One commentator has described $uIe as "one of the final nails in the
consumer expectations coffin." Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit
Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 609, 614 n.31 (1995).
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impossibility of the task it requires: to define just what an
ordinary consumer expects of the technical design charac-
teristics of a product. While it can be assumed that consum-
ers expect a certain level of safety, how is that level defined
when it comes to specific design criteria? For example,
what do consumers expect of the structural soundness of
one type of metal as opposed to another with slightly
different characteristics that, if used, would require chang-
es in still other aspects of the design? If the ordinary
consumer can be said reasonably to expect a product to be
"strong," how strong is strong? Is a general impression of
strength or quality sufficient when it comes to technical
design features? If so, how is that impression measurable
against the actual condition of the design feature in ques-
tion? These difficult questions led many courts to reject the
consumer expectations test as the sole test for defective
design.
Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard
of Responsibility, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1217, 1236-37 (1993)
(citations omitted); see also Michael D. Green, The Schizophre-
nia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48
Vand. L. Rev. 609, 615 (1995) (applauding and explaining the
"triumph of risk benefit (and negligence) over consumer expec-
tations for design defect litigation").
Indeed, the consumer expectation test was heavily criticized
long before the ALI considered a products liability Restate-
ment. As one commentator put it:
An obvious imperfection in applying the "reasonable con-
sumer expectations" test of defectiveness is that a consumer
rarely, if ever, expects to be injured by a product, and
under this test it can be readily found through hindsight
that a defect existed in almost any instance in which one
sustains an injury from the use of a product. Such a result
is obviously outside the Restatement [Second] authors'
contemplation of the term "defect," for "defect becomes a
fiction if it means nothing more than a condition causing
physical injury."
1 M. Stuart Madden, Products Liability § 6.7, at 209 (2d ed.
1988) (citation omitted). See also W. Page Keeton, Products
Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
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Cumb. L. Rev. 293, 302-05 (1979) (criticizing use of the consu-
mer expectation test in design defect cases); Gary T. Schwartz,
Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Cal. L. Rev.
435, 471-81 (1979) (describing the unworkability of the con-
sumer expectation test as an independent basis for products
liability verdicts); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,829 (1973) (explaining
that the consumer expectations test is largely inappropriate for
determining design defects because consumers in design cases
typically do not have any reasonable expectations).
These authorities highlight the deficiencies of an unfettered
consumer expectations test in design defect products liability
cases. The Restatement (Third) effectively looks beyond the
nomenclature and captures the intent of the vast majority of
courts that have struggled to articulate a more meaningful
approach to evaluating the design of a product. The time is ripe
for this Court to follow suit.
2. Plaintiffs Self-Serving Attacks on the Restatement
(Third) Ignore the Careful and Deliberate Reporting,
Drafting, and Voting that Culminated in That Docu-
ment.
Plaintiff s brief argues at great length that Cascade is asking
this Court to adopt section 2(b) simply because the ALI has put
it into a Restatement. On the contrary, Cascade urges the
Court to embrace section 2(b) because it is good law, and adopt-
ing it is a sensible course of action. Nevertheless, just as this
Court found the ALI's views worthy of consideration twenty-
five years ago when it adopted Restatement (Second) section
402A, the Court should consider the Restatement (Third) as
worthy of serious attention. Indeed, the process and the result
may well entitle it to even greater deference because of the
conscientious efforts of both the Reporters and the ALI to
attend to the concerns of lawyers with real world experience
in products liability litigation.
Before a document can become a Restatement, it must pass
through several stages of drafting and voting. For the drafting
stage, Reporters are appointed by the director of the ALI
subject to approval by the sixty-member ALI Council or the
executive committee. The Reporters are aided by a group of
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nineteen advisors and a consultative group of nearly 250 ALI
members, both of which represent a cross-section of judges,
lawyers, and law professors.
The Reporters meet periodically with the advisors and the
consultative group to discuss the Restatement and its contents.
The Reporters then write a preliminary draft and submit it to
the advisors and the consultative group. In addition, in the
case of the products liability Restatement project, various
members of the plaintiff and defense bars met with the Report-
ers as liaisons to provide input on behalf of their respective
constituents. See M. Stuart Madden, The Preliminary Draft of
a Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
15 J. Prod. & Toxics Liab. 163, 163 (1993) [hereinafter Madden,
Preliminary Drafti ("ITIhe Reporters and the ALI have under-
taken a commendable effort to invite and consider views of a
wide spectrum of the practicing bar, law professors, and
members of the judiciary."). The Reporters revise the prelimi-
nary draft, often several times, and submit the revised draft
to the ALI Council as a "council draft." After review and
approval by the council, which may or may not call for more
revision, the council draft becomes a "tentative draft." "At each
stage of [this] reviewing process, a Draft may be referred back
for revision and resubmission." Restatement (Third) inside
cover.
Given this process of careful deliberation and consultation,
the Restatement (Third) hardly represents a revolution in tort
and products liability law. It represents quite the opposite:
The Institute's goal has been described as the rationaliza-
tion or reconciliation of incompatible decisional law, and
the explanation of superior rules and their rationales, in
such a way that a state high court considering an issue as
a matter of first impression would be stimulated to adopt
the Restatement position.
... [Tihe Reporters, Professors Henderson and Twerski,
have accomplished this.
Madden, Preliminary Draft, supr, at 168.
It is ironic that the plaintiffs' bar, which now seeks to dis-
miss the ALI as a band of tort revolutionaries out to reform
rather than restate the law, actually applauded the ALI when
it led one of the great revolutions in American tort
law-section 402A. See George L. Priest, Strict Products
Liability: The Original Intent, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2301, 2301
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(1989) ("The adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in 1965 is commonly viewed as initiating a
revolution in the law of torts .... The dimensions of this
conceptual revolution in tort law should not be underestimat-
ed."). When section 402A was adopted, strict products liability
was neither an accepted doctrine nor even a minority position
at the time. In 1965, only one court had imposed strict products
liability, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d
897, 900 (Cal. 1962), and the comments and reporters' notes
to section 402A did not cite a single case in support of a strict
products liability rule.
In contrast, a significant body of law underlies the Restate-
ment (Third), and section 2(b) is grounded in exhaustive, docu-
mented research and analysis of the products liability law of
all fifty states over the past thirty years. Restatement (Third)
§ 2 reporters' note cmt. c. This Court regarded the ALI and
section 402A as a worthwhile guide into the arena of products
liability twenty-five years ago when the Restatement (Second)
had far less support and precedent. See Taylor v. Binford Tools,
123 Hut. 59, 63 (1971). Cascade submits that the firmly
grounded Restatement (Third) warrants the same respect as
this Court articulates a coherent approach for determining
under what circumstances a manufacturer should be held liable
for a design defect.
II. PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF A DESIGN DEFECT TO WITH-
STAND SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DESIGN
DEFECT CLAIM.
A. Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Sufficient
Evidence of a Reasonable Alternative Design.
1. Proof of a Reasonable Alternative Design
Requires Competent Proof that the Proposed
Alternative Affords Greater Overall Safety With-
out Impairing the Characteristics and Features
Inherent to the Product that Make It Desirable to
Consumers.
As comment e to section 2 explains, simply proving that a
design existed that would have prevented the accident in the
case at bar is not sufficient. The evidence must be sufficient to
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allow the trier of fact to make an informed judgment about the
mechanical feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed alter-
native, as well as about the costs, any impairment of the
product's benefits, and new potential dangers or risks associ-
ated with the alternative. See Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. e.
The evidence must show, in short, not only that the design is
technologically feasible, economically feasible, and safer over-
all, but also that it would not make the product significantly
less desirable to consumers. Moreover, that evidence may not
be speculative or conclusory, but must rest on a solid founda-
tion of expert testimony grounded in the scientific method.
Several courts have addressed what a plaintiff must prove
to establish the existence of a reasonable alternative design.
For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff must
"present evidence sufficient to enable a reasonable trier of fact
to conclude. . . that the risk avoided by the alternative design
outweighed the burden of adopting that design." Lavespere v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 183 (5th Cir.
1990) (applying Louisiana law). In deciding that the plaintiff
did not carry this burden, the court observed that (1) the
plaintiff "offered no evidence concerning the extent of the risk
that the alternative design would have avoided" (e.g., "evidence
concerning the frequency of accidents like his own, the econom-
ic costs entailed by those accidents, or the extent of the reduc-
tion in frequency of those accidents" resulting from "the use of
his proposed alternative design"); (2) the plaintiff offered "little,
if any, evidence concerning the burden [incurred by the manu-
facturer in] switching to the alternative design"; and (3)
"[perhaps the most significant failure" was that the plaintiff
offered no evidence concerning "the loss of product utility" that
would have been caused by the use of the alternative design.
Id. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs
proof of the risk that might have been avoided by the
alternative design and of the burden that switching to that
design would have entailed was, to say the least, incom-
plete. Faced with this meagre evidence, no reasonable trier
of fact could have concluded that the balance of those two
factors tipped in favor of the risk avoided. One cannot
balance items of indeterminate weight.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Another court has analyzed the reasonable alternative design
requirement in similar terms:
In order to create a jury issue on Kawasaki's liability for
a defective design, Ziegler was required but failed to pro-
duce evidence showing "the technological feasibility of
manufacturing a product with the suggested safety device
at the time the suspect product was manufactured; the
availability of the materials required; the cost of production
of the suggested device: price to the consumer, including
that of the suggested device: and the chances of consumer
acceptance of a model incorporating such features."
Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 539 A.2d 701,707 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (quoting Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
488 A.2d 516, 519-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)) (emphasis
added).
Thus, a plaintiff must introduce evidence from which the jury
can find not only that the proposed alternative would have
afforded greater safety, but also that it would not have sub-
stantially impaired the function, utility, economy, convenience,
and other features that drive consumer demand for and accep-
tance of the product. See, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
326 N.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Mich. 1982). As the Owens court
explained:
Our conclusion that the plaintiff did not present a prima
facie case is based on the lack of evidence concerning both
the magnitude of the risks involved and the reasonableness
of the proposed alternative design. ...
... Even if this Court could take judicial notice that the
costs involved in attaching a seat belt or other designated
restraint to a forklift would not be great, we cannot take
judicial notice that their use by forklift drivers would be
likely, practical, or more safe. Neither the costs nor the
effects of the other restraints were established.
Id.
In Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978),
the court reversed a verdict for the plaintiffs because the
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plaintiffs showed only the potential feasibility of an alternative
engine design, but introduced no evidence of its real world
practicability, such as its cost, operation, maintenance require-
ments, overall performance, or safety aspects. "If liability for
alleged design defects is to 'stop somewhere short of the
freakish and the fantastic,' plaintiffs' prima facie case of a
defect must show more than the technical possibility of a safer
design." Id. at 1326 (citation omitted).
In this regard, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to show that
the alternative design would have prevented a particular acci-
dent; rather, a plaintiff must prove that the alternative is safer
overall. As the court stated in Wilson:
Plaintiffs' allegations amount to a contention that an
airplane furnished with a standard aircraft engine is
defective because an engine of a different type . . . would
be safer in one particular. It is not proper to submit such
allegations to the jury unless the court is satisfied that
there is evidence from which the jury could find the sug-
gested alternatives are not only technically feasible but also
practicable in terms of cost and the over-all design and
operation of the product. It is part of the required proof
that a design feature is a "defect" to present such evidence.
Id. at 1327; accord Francis v. Clark Equip. Co., 993 F.2d 545,
552 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that proof of the reasonableness
of a proposed alternative design necessarily includes evidence
of the effects on the product's safety in circumstances other
than accidents like the plaintiffs); Owens, 326 N.W.2d at 379
(noting that the plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to prove
that the proposed design alternative would make the product
safer in other foreseeable accidents).
To require a plaintiff to prove both the overall safety and the
actual effects of the proposed design on the function, cost, and
desirability of the product does not impose a new or unreason-
able burden. As one commentator has observed:
The requirement of showing a "practicable" design mini-
mizes the burlesque of a design "man-for-all-seasons"
expert taking the stand and superficially testifying that
an alternate design was "better" and that it was "possi-
ble" or "feasible." The requirement to sufficiently show
"practicability" qualitatively elevates the jury's task into
a meaningful design inquiry on "reasonableness."
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Michael Hoenig, Products Liability: Substantive, Procedural
and Policy Issues 208 (1992).
On the other hand, failure to require detailed proof con-
cerning the costs and benefits of proposed alternative designs
would have enormous practical ramifications. Manufacturers
design products to function in a variety of circumstances and
to meet a variety of needs. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to
raise a jury question merely by suggesting post hoc that the
manufacturer could have designed the product to improve its
function under one particular set of circumstances for one
particular plaintiff, without demonstrating in scientific fashion
the impact of the suggested alternative on the everyday use of
the product. Permitting plaintiffs to present an alternative
design without also requiring explanatory information suffi-
cient to allow the jury to determine what risks and benefits
accompany that design and how those risks and benefits
compare to the risks and benefits of the defendant's design is
neither logical nor good public policy.
2. Plaintiff Has Presented No Evidence that Either Pro-
posed Alternative Design Is a Reasonable One.
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs entire design defect claim rests
on his contention that Cascade should have incorporated a
different suspension system into the fork on the Dirt Warrior.
Plaintiff makes much ado about the fact that other bicycles use
different suspension systems. That fact, however, does not
satisfy Plaintiffs burden of proof. Plaintiff must prove that
these systems were economically feasible, were safer overall,
and would not impair the utility or customer acceptance of the
Dirt Warrior. Plaintiff failed to meet this burden in several
respects.
a. Economic Feasibility and Customer Acceptance
In response to Cascade's motion, Plaintiff relied heavily on
the affidavit of his toy expert, who testified that "an oil-based
suspension fork system" would be a reasonable alternative
design, and the affidavit of his engineering expert, who testi-
fied that his employer, a small Colorado mountain bike com-
pany, utilized yet another alternative design. At most, this
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evidence merely shows the technological availability of other
suspension systems. It did not even begin to prove, however,
the economic feasibility of these alternative designs for use on
the low-cost, low-maintenance Dirt Warrior.
Plaintiff offered no evidence that the Colorado company's de-
sign (which Plaintiffs own affidavit described as a "fringe
design") could be integrated into a large-scale manufacturing
process, such as the one necessary to keep the Dirt Warrior
economically priced. Nor did the affidavits submitted by
Plaintiff controvert Cascade's evidence that the material and
production costs of incorporating an oil-based elastomer sus-
pension system into Cascade's design of the Dirt Warrior would
push the bicycle's price out of the range that customers would
willingly pay for a discount bike, making it prohibitively
expensive. Thus, the only evidence pertaining to the economic
feasibility of these proposed designs demonstrated that they
were not economical alternatives.
Moreover, the Cascade engineer testified that placing the
more complex oil-based suspension fork on the Dirt Warrior
would increase user maintenance requirements. In short,
incorporating Plaintiffs proposed alternative into the design
of the Dirt Warrior would nullify two of the features that drive
consumer demand for the bicycle. Consequently, Plaintiff
produced insufficient evidence of a design defect in the Dirt
Warrior.
b. Overall Safety
Further, although Plaintiff introduced evidence that the
Colorado design would have prevented his accident, he offered
no evidence that that design provided greater overall safety.
Indeed, the record contains no information concerning the
extent of the risk that the alternative design would have
avoided. "In particular, [Plaintiffl offered no evidence con-
cerning the frequency of accidents like his own, the economic
costs entailed by those accidents, or the extent of the reduction
in frequency of those accidents that would have followed on the
use of his proposed alternative design." Lavespere, 910 F.2d at
183; see also Francis, 993 F.2d at 552; Owens, 326 N.W.2d at
378-79; Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1326-27.
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That the proposed alternative systems may not have frac-
tured under the particular circumstances of Plaintiffs accident
does not alone establish these alternatives as "safer" designs.
First, it is undisputed that the fracture of the spring in the
Dirt Warrior did not interfere with the operation of the bicycle
in any way. The effect of the fracture was no different than if
the suspension had come to the end of its travel naturally (or
"bottomed out"), leaving the bicycle with the same performance
characteristics as an ordinary, unsuspended bicycle.
Second, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that
every year hundreds of thousands of injuries occur on bicycles,
including "high-end" bicycles with fancy titanium forks and oil-
based suspensions. Plaintiff adduced absolutely no evidence
that use of an oil-based elastomer suspension system would
reduce the risks of riding a Dirt Warrior to any degree. On the
contrary, an oil-based elastomer system would require more
maintenance, thereby increasing the risk of injury from im-
proper maintenance and potentially offsetting any theoretical
safety advantages of the alternative design. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs insistence on a design that would make the Dirt
Warrior prohibitively expensive might well drive its customers
to the less expensive bicycles offered by its competitors, none
of which come equipped with any mechanical suspension.
By asserting a design defect claim, Plaintiff assumed the
burden of proving the existence of a reasonable alternative
design, the lack of which rendered the Dirt Warrior unrea-
sonably dangerous. In proposing alternative designs, however,
Plaintiffs "proof" fell well short of the mark. It failed to estab-
lish that the alternatives could be produced in a manner and
at a cost that would preserve customer acceptance of the Dirt
Warrior. It failed to establish that the alternatives would in
fact reduce the overall risks associated with the product. It
therefore failed to establish that Cascade adopted a defective
design.
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B. Even if Plaintiff's Evidence Was Sufficient to
Prove the Existence of a Reasonable Alterna-
tive Design, Plaintiff Failed to Adduce Suffi-
cient Evidence that the Dirt Warrior Was
Unreasonably Dangerous.
Even if Plaintiff met his burden of proving a reasonable
alternative design, he must also establish that the actual
design was unreasonably dangerous. In other words, a rea-
sonable alternative design is a necessary element of Plaintiffs
proof of design defect, but it is not sufficient proof; Plaintiff
must also prove that Cascade's failure to utilize the proposed
alternative design (oil-based elastomer system) rendered the
Dirt Warrior's design (steel spring system) unreasonably
dangerous. See, e.g., Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331,
338 (4th Cir. 1991); Hart v. Hytrol Conveyor Co., 823 F. Supp.
87, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Totty v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
[1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 7994
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 1977).
In this case, however, Plaintiff adduced no proof that the
steel spring design was not reasonably safe for its intended
use. Plaintiff did not dispute that the steel spring design would
provide appropriate durability and shock absorbing capability
under the vast majority of circumstances in which the bicycle
ordinarily was ridden. Moreover, the failure to use a particular
suspension system was unrelated to Plaintiffs accident. The
fracture of the steel springs did not impair or interfere with the
basic performance of the bicycle itself. The fracture simply took
the mechanical suspension out of the picture, leaving a bicycle
that could perform like the millions of other unsuspended
bicycles that have been sold and ridden successfully for de-
cades.3
If this type of claim were to prevail, economically priced
products would not be available. All automobiles would be
built-and priced-like Volvos or Mercedes. All bicycles would
be built-and priced-like the high-end models, such that only
a select few consumers would-or could-buy them. Wisely, the
3. If, as Plaintiff argues, Cascade unfairly inflated its consumers' expectations
about the bicycle's performance, that is an issue to be addressed in the context of the
Plaintiffs claim about the representations, warnings, and instructions provided with
the bicycle, not his design defect claim.
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law does not require that manufacturers make the safest or
most durable product. Rather, it requires only that the product
be reasonably safe, a standard that must necessarily take into
account all the other attributes that lead reasonable consumers
to choose one product over another. Plaintiff cannot show that
Cascade unreasonably offered its purchasers an inexpensive
bicycle with a mechanical suspension that would enhance the
comfort and performance of the bicycle under most anticipated
riding conditions. Plaintiff cannot claim that the Dirt Warrior's
design was unreasonably dangerous simply because it would
not match the durability of a model twice its price.
Conclusion
The district court erred as a matter of law in two respects.
First, it erred in concluding that Hutchins law permitted
Plaintiff to make a prima facie design defect case without proof
of a reasonable alternative to the allegedly defective design.
Second, the court erred in finding that Plaintiff had proffered
sufficient evidence of a design defect to withstand summary
judgment regardless of whether the Restatement (Third)
standard applied.
Accordingly, Cascade respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the district court's ruling and order entry of partial
summary judgment for Cascade on Plaintiffs design defect
claim.
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INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of the De-
fendant's motion for partial summary judgment. In its motion,
the Defendant contended, both as a matter of law and evidence,
that the Plaintiffs defective design claim was insufficient
under the standard set forth in the new Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability section 2(b). The district court
refused to apply the standard set forth in the new Restatement
and held further that, even if applicable, Plaintiffs evidence
was sufficient.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law
when it refused to apply the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability section 2(b) standard in decid-
ing Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.
II. Whether, if Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability section 2(b) is applied, Defendant is entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim of design
defect.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Timmy Tumble was severely injured on July 12, 1995, when
a spring in the suspension fork of his Cascade Dirt Warrior
bike broke, causing the fork to unexpectedly "bottom out" and
throwing him head-first into the ground. At the time, Timmy
was riding his bike on a dirt trail near his home. A mountain
bike normally is used this way, a fact confirmed by a Cascade
television advertisement showing children riding its bikes on
dirt trails in wooded areas, the front cover of the Dirt Warrior
Owners Manual featuring a picture of a child riding on a dirt
road, and references in the manual to riding on "rough terrain."
More to the point, Defendant's advertisement and marketing
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created a reasonable expectation that its bikes would perform
safely in the way Timmy was using his when he was injured.
The model in question-the Dirt Warrior-is from the lower
end of Cascade's line of bikes and is targeted specifically at
children of Timmy's age. Its suspension fork uses a steel spring
design that is unreasonable and inadequate for off-road rough
surfaces, a fact that was not disclosed to Timmy or any other
consumer. The evidence showed that the safety of that particu-
lar design had been questioned on a number of occasions.
Other models of Cascade bikes, as well as bikes made by
other manufacturers, utilize oil-based suspension forks. Plain-
tiff presented evidence of two reasonable alternative designs:
one an oil-based design used by Cascade and other manufactur-
ers, and the other based upon a Denver mountain bike design,
together with evidence that an alternative design would have
prevented the injury.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should not discard more than thirty years of law
to adopt a rigid, draconian rule that will not promote the public
good. The new Restatement on products liability will relieve
manufacturers of liability in a certain number of cases, and
thus has enjoyed considerable support from business groups
and other special interests, but adopting it would not be good
law or good public policy. It is not a statute or other law that
this Court must apply, it is not supported by the overwhelming
case law, and it will prevent many injured consumers from
obtaining justice.
Alternatively, even if section 2(b) were applicable, Plaintiff
has provided more than adequate proof that raises substantial
factual issues on the design of the bicycle in question, including
evidence of two reasonable alternative designs. Plaintiff also
has shown, through circumstantial evidence, that Defendant
put marketing strategy and ultimate profit ahead of safety in
its choice of design for the bicycle whose failed design caused
the serious injuries in this case.
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ARGUMENT
I. IN DENYING DEFENDANT CASCADE'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE DIS-
TRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) TORTS SECTION 402A RATHER
THAN SECTION 2(b) OF THE NEWLY APPROVED
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY.
In its motion for partial summary judgment, Defendant
Cascade argued that the District Court should apply the
standard for design defect enunciated in the American Law
Institute's (ALI) Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Lia-
bility (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (hereinafter Restatement
(Third)). The rules contained in the Restatement (Third) would
amount to a drastic change in Hutchins law since this Court,
along with the great majority of other states, long ago adopted
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the con-
sumer expectations test as Hutchins law. See Taylor v. Binford
Tools, Inc., 123 Hut. 59, 62 (1971); Oscar S. Gray, The Draft
ALI Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism?, 61
Tenn. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 (1994) (noting the importance of
section 402A "[in most American jurisdictions"); Marshall S.
Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 636-39 (1995)
(noting that section 402A had won support in most states by
the 1970s).
Many foreign jurisdictions have adopted the spirit of the
Restatement (Second). Citing the decade-old European Union
Council Directive 85/374, one commentator has noted that it
"projects a conception of strict liability that is, if anything,
more extensive and consumer-biased than virtually any Ameri-
can state jurisprudence." Shapo, supra, at 650. Australia has
also formally adopted the principle of strict liability for injuries
caused by defective products. See Trade Practices Act, 1974,
pt. V, § 65c (Austl.) (stating that "a person [who] suffers loss
or damage by reason of a defect . . . shall be deemed for the
purposes of this Act to have suffered the loss or damage by the
supplying of the goods"). This Court's adoption of the rule of
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the Restatement (Third) would effect a sweeping change that
would fly in the face of the deliberate, case-by-case common
law process and would amount to an unwarranted use of a
"Restatement" of the law.
Traditionally, Restatements from the ALI have been utilized
by the courts to answer questions about unsettled law. See The
Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional
Memories: Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, The
Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 & n.10 (1995). In
fact, the traditional statement of the charge to Reporters
investigating new subject matter for future Restatements is
that they should consider themselves justices of the supreme
court of a hypothetical fifty-first state who must rule on a
question of law that is unsettled in their state. See M. Stuart
Madden, The Preliminary Draft of a Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 15 J. Prod. & Toxics Liab.
163, 168 (1993). Inasmuch as the rules of decision for products
liability claims are settled in Hutchins, the Restatement
(Third) should not be considered unless a persuasive case can
be made for overturning existing law. For the reasons that
follow, no such case exists.
A. The Restatement (Third) Would Not Be
Good Law.
For more than thirty years, section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965) (hereinafter Restatement (Second)) has
achieved justice and social good by requiring manufacturers of
unreasonably dangerous products to bear the cost of the
injuries caused by those products. In the process, section 402A
has been cited in at least 3000 decisions and has become the
single most frequently cited Restatement section of all time.
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512, 1512 n.1 (1992). Indeed, much of the
reputation the ALI enjoyed until recently as a scholarly organi-
zation has been attributable, directly or indirectly, to its
development of the Restatement (Second) and the principled
and humane consumer protection standards that have followed
from section 402A. Product safety has improved greatly in the
United States in recent years, precisely because of the
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deterrent effects of section 402A, making U.S. products highly
desirable and competitive worldwide and giving them a reputa-
tion for safety envied by much of the developed world. See
Product Liability Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 102nd Cong. 67
(1991) (testimony of Mark Hager, Professor, Washington
College of Law, American University).
According to the manufacturers themselves, the products
liability rules of section 402A have promoted safer products
significantly by affecting the management decisionmaking
process. As a result, "Where product liability has had a notable
impact-where it has most significantly affected management
decision making-has been in the quality of the products
themselves. Managers say products have become safer, man-
ufacturing procedures have been improved, and labels and use
instructions have become more explicit." Nathan Weber,
Product Liability: The Corporate Response 2 (1987).
Although entitled "strict liability" by the ALI, section 402A
liability has been anything but absolute. Injured consumers
bear the burden of proving that the product is "unreasonably
dangerous," and products liability cases have been, and con-
tinue to be, some of the most difficult to litigate. Recent studies
show that plaintiffs are successful in less than half of products
liability cases. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Civil
Juries and the Politics of Reform 169 tbl. 5.1, 185 tbl. 5.9
(1995) (reporting win rates in various cities at various times,
with rates uniformly under 50%); James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liabili-
ty: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479,
522-27 (1990) (giving statistics about plaintiffs' declining
success rates in the 1980s); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
GAO/HRD-89-99, Product Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolu-
tion in Five States 3 (1989) [hereinafter GAO/HRD-89-99
(noting that plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages in
45% of the cases studied).
In recent years, however, the manufacturing community has
generated considerable controversy about products liability
cases as manufacturers have promoted a broad tort reform
agenda. Rather than seeking to improve the law in some
balanced, fair manner, those efforts have sought to achieve a
one-sided advantage for defendant manufacturers. Lost in the
propaganda of that campaign are the facts that products
liability cases represent only an infinitesimally small
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number-barely two-tenths of one percent-of the civil cases
in the courts, see Court Statistics Project, National Ctr. for
State Courts et. al., State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual
Report 1992 5 (1994) (estimating that of about 93 million court
cases filed in state trial courts in 1992, 19.7 million were civil
cases, of which just over one million were tort cases, and that
four percent of the tort filings were products liability cases),
that empirical studies show that products liability awards are
consistent with the type and severity of injury, see GAO/HRD-
89-99, supra, at 27, and that the cost of products liability
insurance premiums is less than one percent of retail product
sales, see Peter Reuter, Institute for Civil Justice, The Econom-
ic Consequences of Expanded Corporate Liability: An Explor-
atory Study at v (1988). Also lost in the "tort reform" propagan-
da is the fact that the Consumer Federation of America reports
that approximately 6000 deaths and millions of injuries are
prevented on an annual basis because of products liability
actions. See Product Liability Reform: Hearing on Product
Liability Reform Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce. Science & Transp., 100th Cong.
54 (1987) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman, Legislative Director,
Consumer Federation of America).
By abolishing section 402A, the Restatement (Third) proposes
to upset, and potentially undermine, this system, substituting
instead a new, untried formula to define the circumstances
under which product sellers will be held accountable for
injuries caused by their products. In so doing, it creates the
potential for plunging products liability law into years of
quagmire and uncertainty.4
The nature of this sea change was recognized recently in the
related area of defective medical products in a concurring
opinion by Justice Opala of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 894 (Okla. 1994), in
which he noted that section 8 of Council Draft No. 2 of the Re-
statement (Third) would "dramatically depart from" the
4. Some proponents of the Restatement (Third) have argued that the radical
change it would entail should not deter courts from adopting it, because section 402A
itself was radical when it was adopted by the AL. Section 402A, however, underwent
a protracted process of distillation from pre-existing court decisions over a period of
many years. By the time it was approved finally by vote of the ALI membership, it
had been adopted by a majority of states while still in a Tentative Draft form. Thus,
by the time it was finally adopted it was anything but radical, a situation far different
from that of the Restatement (Third).
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"[m]ainstream products liability jurisprudence [which]
generally interprets Comment k [to Restatement (Second)
§ 402A as it relates to medical devices] to create a manufactur-
er's affirmative defense." He observed that the Restatement
(Third) "would transfer the burden of proof in its entirety to
the plaintiff-user of the device." See id.
This major policy change is manifested in three ways: the
imposition of a rigid, new reasonable alternative design test,
the attendant increase in litigation costs, and the abolition of
the consumer expectations test.
1. The Reasonable Alternative Design Test
The Restatement (Third) would impose a new, absolute
requirement on plaintiffs to present proof of a reasonable alter-
native design. Although such a requirement has been a com-
mon focal point for legislative efforts at "tort reform," the clear
majority of jurisdictions do not require it as part of the prima
facie case of the plaintiff. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev.
1407, 1408 (1994) (disputing the Reporters' statement that a
majority of jurisdictions support the reasonable alternative
design requirement); John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New
Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for
Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of
the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493,
536 (1996) (same). The availability of a reasonable alternative
design is, and should be, an important consideration in deter-
mining design liability, but requiring it to be the determining
factor in every case would unfairly place a potentially insur-
mountable stumbling block in the way of every consumer
injured by a badly designed product.
The Reporters for this project, Professors James Henderson
and Aaron Twerski, have been quick to point out that the
literal language of section 2 "does not require the plaintiff
actually to produce a prototype in order to make out a prima
facie case." Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. e. That, however, is
cold comfort to consumers who would encounter drastically in-
creased litigation costs with little likely improvement in the
reliability of proof if section 2(b) is followed by the courts. The
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Reporters' response primarily has been to deflect this criticism
as an attempt to avoid entirely the use of expert witnesses in
products liability litigation-a decision no experienced practi-
tioner would willingly make. "According to Twerski, what some
attorneys may unrealistically want is the ability to go into a
case without an expert." Bruce S. Kaufman, Attorneys Spar
Over Restatement (Third) of Torts; ATLA To Mobilize Opposi-
tion to ALI Project, 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 436,
437 (April 22, 1994) [hereinafter Attorneys Spar. A fair read-
ing of the comments to the Restatement (Third) makes clear
that without a design expert with a redesign of the product, no
case based on faulty design will reach a jury. Although the
Reporters state that a plaintiff need not produce a working
prototype to prevail at trial, plaintiffs will have to convince a
jury that they have proposed a better alternative design. This
requirement will create several barriers to injured consumers'
access to justice.
First, even in cases involving the simplest products, regard-
less of how obviously dangerous, the plaintiff must now have
an expert redesign the product. In cases involving products
that do not cause major injuries, the additional likely expense
will make a reasonable recovery impossible.
Second, if the product involved is highly complex, such as an
aircraft or electronically managed piece of machinery, the
expense of even discovering the factors involved in the design
may be prohibitive.
Third, if the plaintiffs cannot develop a "better" IUD, a
"better" breast implant, or "better" asbestos and prove the
safety and marketability of the "better" product, claims based
on what are now recognized as dangerous products largely will
be eliminated. A recent example involves the rear door latches
on 4.5 million Chrysler mini-vans, which Chrysler reportedly
will have to spend $90 million to replace by the end of its recall
program. See Neal Templin & Albert R. Karr, Chrysler. Ending
Dispute. Will Replace Rear Latches on 4.5 Million Minivans,
Wall Street J., Mar. 28, 1995, at C12. Latch failures have been
linked to twenty-five deaths, but none could be the subject of
a successful products liability suit under the proposed Restate-
ment (Third) unless the plaintiff could produce a design for a
"better" latch.
The draconian effects of the reasonable alternative design
rule are not just idle speculation. One court has already
excluded testimony of a plaintiffs expert witness, an engineer,
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because he had not produced a complete, testable design for a
power saw that could not have cut the plaintiff's hand. See
Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567 (N.D.
Ill. 1993). In Stanczyk, plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that
testing his expert's theory by producing an alternative design
for the saw would have cost between $20,000 and $40,000,
which he could not afford to pay. See id. at 568. Although the
decision was based on the United States Supreme Court
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) (holding that a trial judge must ensure that an expert's
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant
to the task at hand), its substantive effect closely parallels
Defendant's interpretation of the Restatement (Third) in this
case. Rulings like this would sound the death knell for most
products liability claims.
2. Increased Litigation Costs
By imposing an absolute requirement of proof of a reasonable
alternative design, the Restatement (Third) appears to disre-
gard basic economic facts about consumers and plaintiff
practitioners, and in effect would make prosecution of average
cases a practical impossibility because of the increased costs
involved in satisfying the reasonable alternative design re-
quirement. The Reporters have implied that they view this as
merely an economics of law practice issue for plaintiff trial
lawyers, the solution of which is beyond the scope of their
assignment. See Attorneys Spar, supra, at 437. On the other
hand, the Reporters have expressed concern in the past for the
economic plight of manufacturers of products, raising the
question of whether a double standard is being used. See
Impact of the Product Liability System on Small Business:
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on SBA. the Gen. Econ.
and Minority Enter. Dev. and the Subcomm. on Exports, Tax
Policy and Special Problems of the House Comm. on Small
Bus., 102nd Cong. 81-83 (1992) (statement of James A.
Henderson, Jr., Professor, Cornell School of Law). Surely
consumers' need for competent attorneys to represent them for
legitimate causes of action and to be able to present a case is
of equal importance with manufacturers' need to obtain insur-
ance. The Reporters' remark in comment e to section 2 that the
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reasonable alternative design requirement "should not be
construed to create artificial and unreasonable barriers to
recovery" is likely to become lost in the adversarial environ-
ment of litigation. See Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. e.
3. Consumer Expectations
Numerous practitioners and academics believe that the
consumer expectations test currently used in Hutchins and
many other states should be an alternative basis for liability,
or that it at least should be a prominent consideration when
analyzing a product defect under a risk-utility balancing test.
For instance, the pattern jury instruction used in Florida
provides a design defect test, which demonstrates the two
alternative tests and exemplifies the dominant judicial for-
mulation of the rule: "A product is unreasonably dangerous
because of its design if [the product fails to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used as intended
or in a manner reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer]
[or] [the risk of danger outweighs the benefits]." Fla. Sup. Ct.
Standard Jury Instruction PL5 (brackets in original). The
Restatement (Third), however, rejects this widely used, simple
test of defect, thus limiting a manufacturer's duty to design
safe products. Under the standard articulated in section 2(b),
a manufacturer could design a product that would not perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect and yet not
have any responsibility for resulting injuries.
It is no answer for Defendant to argue that the reasonable
alternative design requirement is the substantive equivalent
of the consumer expectations test because consumers cannot
expect something from a product that cannot be incorporated
into a reasonable alternative design. That argument falls of its
own weight. If the two doctrines were essentially the same,
then the Restatement (Third) would be unnecessary. Moreover,
as the Reporters themselves made clear, the purpose of the
reasonable alternative design test was to eliminate the con-
sumer expectation test as an independent standard for measur-
ing product defectiveness. See Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. f.
Of course the two tests are not the same. The consumer
expectations test arises from a representational back-
ground-the consumer has been led or has come to expect some
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level of performance or safety. The reasonable alternative
design test instead focuses exclusively on the technical or
engineering design aspects of the product to the exclusion of
what the consumer might or does expect. As such, the reason-
able alternative design test ignores the realities of modern
marketing, which empower manufacturers with almost un-
limited ability to create and raise expectations about products.
As this case illustrates, consumers easily can be led by
manufacturers to expect that a low-cost mountain bike con-
taining a suspension fork will perform safely on off-road, rough
terrain. When manufacturers create expectations that exceed
their design capabilities, as can occur easily when promoting
products in the "discount" market, they should not be allowed
to escape responsibility for unsafe designs by the bootstrap
argument that other alternative designs are too expensive or
too difficult to engineer. Allowing those types of arguments is
nothing less than allowing the manufacturing defendant to set
the liability standard it must meet.
The consumer expectations test is good public policy precisely
because it does not require proof that there was another way
to design the product. A manufacturer is still free to argue that
the product has a societal value notwithstanding its danger or
that creating a design without the danger was so impractical
as to be impossible, just as a fact finder can decide that be-
cause of its inherent dangers, the product should not have been
made. Such a balancing of the burdens of persuasion is consis-
tent with the relative positions of consumers and manufactur-
ers andwith the assumed expertise of manufacturers. To place
the entire burden on the consumer is unwise and imprudent.
B. There Is Persuasive Criticism
of the Restatement (Third).
While the Restatement (Third) surely has its supporters, its
controversial nature has spawned a substantial body of criti-
cism by academics who have no personal, financial, or
reputational stake in the implementation of the project's
proposed new liability rules. A number of articles critical of the
proposals of the Restatement (Third) appear in the 1994 issue
of the Tennessee Law Review. See A Symposium on the ALI's
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Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61
Tenn. L. Rev. 1043 (1994).
One of the most thorough analyses of the Restatement
(Third) and the reasons that its policies and approach are ill-
advised is that of Professor Marshall Shapo of Northwestern
University School of Law. In a recent article, Professor Shapo
focuses his critique on several parts of the Restatement (Third)
that go well beyond merely "restating" the law and that, in
fact, would make dramatic changes in well-settled judicial
interpretation and courtroom practice, tending to reduce
current levels of consumer protection. See Marshall S. Shapo,
In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restate-
ment Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 651-88 (1995). Professor
Shapo criticizes several aspects of the Restatement (Third):
" the severing of products liability law from thirty years
of development of the strict liability doctrine of§ 402A,
embodied in thousands of decisions, see id. at 691-96,
and its potential unmooring from the general body of
tort law, see id. at 651-52;
" a rigid requirement that plaintiffs prove the existence
of a "reasonable alternative design" in defective design
cases, unsupported by any clear trend in current case
law, see id. at 668-71;
" an equally rigid insistence on a risk-utility analysis as
the sole criterion for judging design defects, see id. at
660-64;
* a shunning of the consumer expectation test long used
by many courts, despite the domination by sellers of
promotional aspects of product sales and distribution,
see id. at 664-68;
" potential departures from basic negligence law, see id.
at 669-70, and a potential collision with the Uniform
Commercial Code, see id. at 680; and
" the apparent elimination of a good deal of the flexibil-
ity in judgment currently available to courts in this
heavily fact-oriented area of the law, see id. at 687-88.
Perhaps most powerfully, Professor Shapo argues that the
history of ALI and its Restatements counsel restraint in the
adoption of proposals that would achieve far-reaching changes
in the law. "[T]his principle of self-restraint," he writes,
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"applies doubly when political overtones provide a substantial
amount of background noise." Id. at 686.
C. The Restatement (Third) Is Not a Law.
The Restatements of the ALI were intended to adapt the law
"to social needs, to secure the better administration ofjustice,
and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal
work." Bylaws, 72 A.L.I. Proc. 1.01 (1996). For years the ALI
has received wide praise for the great contributions it made to
progressive pragmatic reform of the law. But in recent years
concern has been growing that ALI projects are flawed because
the ALI has become politicized and subject to special interest
lobbying, that its process is unchecked and unaccountable, that
it is controlled by small minorities of the membership, and that
it has strayed from its original purpose of progressive reform
into the dangerous arena of "legislating" balances between
competing interests. See, Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liabili-
ty: Should Courts Buy the Proposed Restatement?, Trial, Nov.
1996, at 24-28 [hereinafter Shapo, Should Courts Buy].
The ALI products liability endeavor illustrates these criti-
cisms. The Reporters came to the project already having
expressed their bias in favor of federal products liability
reform. See. e.g., Product Liability: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce. Science & Transp., 102nd Cong. 102 (1991) (statement
of Aaron Twerski, Professor, Brooklyn Law School) (opining
that the Product Liability Fairness Act "ought to be passed");
Impact of the Product Liability System on Small Business:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on SBA, Gen. Econ., &
Minority Enter. Dev. & Subcomm. on Exports, Tax Policy. &
Special Problems of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 102nd
Cong. 23 (1992) (statement of James A. Henderson, Jr., Pro-
fessor, Cornell School of Law) (opining that Congress should
play a "limited moderate role" in products liability reform).
Professor Twerski suggests, "The product liability crisis has,
for the first time, created a real possibility that major sub-
stantive tort law reform will take place at the federal level.
The contributions of highly respected academicians to the
legislative deliberations have been significant." Aaron D.
Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations:
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Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability
Litigation, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 861, 864-65 (1983) (footnote
omitted). Professor Twerski also noted that "Professor James
A. Henderson, Jr.... had a significant role in drafting major
provisions that were ultimately incorporated into S. 44 [a 1979
Senate Bill]." Id. at 865 n.10. Indeed, in introducing their
concept for a section 402A revision, the ALI Reporters an-
nounced that "most reform statutes fit nicely into our revised
black letter restatement of existing law." James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512,
1529 (1992). Rather than progressive pragmatic reform, the
purpose of the project, as stated in the original draft, was "to
seek an appropriate balance ... between ... consumer and
worker interests and ... producers of goods." Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability at xiii (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1994).
Each of the Tentative Drafts was adopted by bare majorities
of a small minority of ALI members (frequently only a few
hundred out of a total membership of approximately 3500
members) who attend the ALI's annual meeting. Indeed, at the
1994 ALI annual meeting, after a floor vote, the entire Restate-
ment (Third) project was recommitted to the Reporters for
further study. See ALI Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Products
Liability Efforts, 62 U.S.L.W. 2734, 2735 (May 31, 1994). One
year later, the Bureau of National Affairs characterized the
1995 annual meeting as more an out-and-out battle between
the plaintiff and defense bars than a search for good products
liability policy. See Key Sections of Treatise Gain Approval at
Annual Meeting of American Law Institute, 23 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 563, 563 (May 26, 1995).
While the process utilized in the formulation of the Re-
statement (Third) allowed input from various interests, in-
cluding the plaintiff bar, the Reporters were not required to
accept even well-supported proposals, and they remained
unyielding on their central propositions abolishing section
402A, any negligence-based cause of action, and the consumer
expectation test, and substituting instead an absolute require-
ment of proof of a reasonable alternative design. And, although
most of the sections of the Restatement (Third) submitted for
approval by the members at that meeting were in fact ap-
proved, the entire subject was highly controversial and a
motion to reject sections 1 and 2 in their entirety was defeated
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only by a majority of about three to two. As such, the final
form of the Restatement (Third) is not much a result of dispas-
sionate consideration of the path the law has taken or should
take, but rather a product of lobbying, of debate, of vote-
counting, and, sometimes, of compromise.
Who are the people who wield this power over the future of
the law? The ALI membership is composed of lawyers selected
to represent the practicing bar, the judiciary, and the academic
community. Many are recognized by their peers as especially
knowledgeable in some specialized field of law. Many, however,
are generalists, and few have had practical experience in the
field of tort law, whether as practitioners,judges, or academics,
and so lack expertise in that area. At the same time, declines
in professionalism and the rise of materialistic goals with a
corresponding focus on serving client interests has undermined
traditional concepts of independence, raising the specter of
special interest voting. See Shapo, Should Courts Buy, supra,
at 28.
The bar should welcome discussion and debate about the
desirability of changes in legal rules, even in the important
field of consumer protection, so long as the participants agree
to be objective and not to pursue a partisan agenda. No less a
figure than Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, has written that "whether the
individual members of the ALI can indeed remain objective is
open to question. And although this quandary is not new, the
increasing influence of the Institute and the controversial
nature of its projects serve to compound the problem." The
Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional
Memories: Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, The
Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1995); see also John
F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law
Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products
Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493, 517 (1996) (com-
menting that debate over the alternative design proposal
during the 1994 Annual Meeting "revealed that the ALI's policy
that 'each member must leave his client at the door' may, in
reality, be difficult, if not impossible to meet" (footnote omit-
ted)).
Several ALI projects in the recent past have been contro-
versial, and in two notable cases, including a project on cor-
porate governance and another on enterprise liability (later
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published as American Law Inst., Reporters' Study: Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991)), they have been
aborted before they reached the "Restatement" stage. In the
case of the corporate governance project, the decision came
amid allegations that ALI members, in discussing the project
with others and in voting on it at meetings, were in fact
representing the corporate interests for whom they worked in
their law practices. See Abrahamson, supra, at 31. The many
concerns voiced about the ALI's internal processes, policies,
and politics illustrate that, in this instance, as in so many
others, serious questions exist about the objectivity and merits
of the final product. This court should not adopt a standard
that is a result of this flawed process.
D. The Restatement (Third) Is Not the Law.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., called law simply "[tihe
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.
Rev. 457, 461 (1897). Whether viewed in those terms or any
other, the Restatement (Third) does not represent a statement
of what the law is or what the courts will do. Even some
members of the products liability defense bar have voiced
concerns about the direction the project has taken, and a recent
article by two prominent products liability defense attorneys
argues that Professors Henderson and Twerski's Restatement
proposal "reflects neither the evolution nor the true state of
existing products liability law." Roland F. Banks & Margaret
O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second), Section
402A-Design Defect, 72 Or. L. Rev. 411, 411 (1993). Indeed,
the term "Restatement" is a misnomer when applied to many
of the ALI's projects, and especially so in this instance.
Professors Henderson and Twerski have been praised- both
by those who agree with their product and by those who do
not-for the fair hearing they have given to diverse viewpoints,
and for the prodigious amount of work and time they have
devoted to their project. They have also been criticized, howev-
er, for going well beyond the common understanding of a
"restatement" of past court decisions and for engaging in what
might best be described as academic tort "reform" at the
expense of modern-day consumers.
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By far, the greatest complaint voiced against the Restate-
ment (Third) is the paucity of case law to support the Report-
ers' adoption of the "reasonable alternative design" doctrine,
the very issue that forms the crux of this case. In supporting
their new concept of design defect, the Reporters have cited
dozens of court decisions and statutes in a substantial report-
ers' note. See Restatement (Third) § 2 reporter's note cmt. c.
The authorities cited, however, hardly constitute clear or
unambiguous support for the reasonable alternative design test
and include statutory law from only four states that require
proof of a reasonable alternative design to get to the jury:
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Texas. See La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.56 (West 1991) ("A product is unreasonably
dangerous in design if [a reasonable alternative design exist-
ed]."); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (1996) ("In any [design defect]
action [claimant must prove that the] product failed to function
as expected and there existed a feasible design alternative that
would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm.");
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987) ("In any [design defect]
action ... the manufacturer... shall not be liable if... there
was not a practical and technically feasible alternative design
that would have prevented the harm without substantially
impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of
the product. . . ."); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.005
(West Supp. 1997) ("In a [design defect] action ... the burden
is on the claimant to prove ... that ... there was a safer
alternative design . . . ."). These four statutes are tort reform
statutes promoted heavily by manufacturing interests and
subject to the pressures for compromise typically found in the
state legislatures rather than to appeals of public welfare and
common sense. As such, the statutes were clearly intended to
change existing law at the time of their passage, and they
cannot serve as authority for this Court-both for reasons of
logic and because of the ALI's longstanding focus on decisional,
not statutory, law. Most troubling about the statutory citations,
however, is the appearance that the Reporters, who have
testified in favor of federal products liability reform legislation,
may have felt too much the gravitational pull of tort reform.
See Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 698 (1995) ("In the
uncertainty of the moment ... politicization of the common law
of torts is risky business, whether done by Congress or the
American Law Institute.").
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Even if one accepts the Reporters' characterization of the
decisions, which in itself has been a subject of debate in
academia, see John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The
American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A
Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493, 536-38
(1996), they have identified only six jurisdictions in which the
highest court has required proof of a reasonable alternative
design. See Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. c; see also General
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1189 (Ala. 1985)
("[P]roof of defectiveness ... requires proof that a 'safer'
practical, alternative design was available to the manufactur-
er."); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (Mass.
1978) ("[Tlhere is a case for the jury if the plaintiff can show
an available design modification which would reduce the risk
without undue cost or interference with the performance of the
machinery."); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372,
378-79 (Mich. 1982) ("Our conclusion that the plaintiff did not
present a prima facie case is based on the lack of evidence con-
cerning both the magnitude of the risks involved and the
reasonableness of the proposed alternative design."); Voss v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983)
("The plaintiff [is obligated] to present evidence that the
product, as designed, was not reasonably safe because there
was a substantial likelihood of harm and it was feasible to
design the product in a safer manner."); Azzarello v. Black
Bros. Co., Inc., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978) (holding that,
as part of its assessment of the facts presented, "the jury may
find a defect where the product left the supplier's control
lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended
use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the
intended use"); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253
S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979) ("[Tlhe general test for establish-
ing strict liability in tort is whether the involved product is
defective in the sense that it is not reasonably safe for its in-
tended use. The standard of reasonable safeness is determined
... by what a reasonably prudent manufacturer's standards
should have been at the time the product was made."). The
validity of this support is open to serious question. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, for example, has since held that proof
of an alternative design is not required, DiFrancesco v. Excam,
Inc., 642 A.2d 529, 531 (Pa. 1994) ("Pennsylvania courts have
not imposed such rigorous restrictions in strict liability cases."),
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thus reducing support for section 2(b) to potentially only five
jurisdictions. A fair reading of some of the other cases raises
questions about whether the decisions clearly require alterna-
tive design proof. Concerns about lack of support have led a
number of academics to question the underpinnings of the
Restatement (Third), including one article that argues bluntly
that section 2(b), which deals with precisely the controversy of
this lawsuit, "is not supported by the case law." See Frank J.
Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts. Products Liability,
Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 167, 168 (1995).
More to the point, no jurisprudential trend favors the Re-
statement (Third). Since Professors Henderson and Twerski
first proposed revising the Restatement, not a single court has
adopted the reasonable alternative design test. See, e.g., Denny
v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730,735 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that
availability of a safer design is only one of many factors in a
design defect inquiry).
Under all of these circumstances, the Restatement (Third)
is not sufficiently grounded on authority to warrant its adop-
tion as a replacement for the well-developed existing law of
products liability.
II. EVEN IF SECTION 2(B) OF THE RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) IS APPLIED TO THIS CASE, DEFEN-
DANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF DESIGN
DEFECT.
To be entitled to partial summary judgment, Defendant must
show the complete absence of any factual issue and that, under
the undisputed facts, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The Restatement (Third) neither changes these
well-established rules nor imposes any new burdens on the
Plaintiff to defeat a summary judgment motion. See Restate-
ment (Third) § 2 cmt. e ("This Restatement takes no position
regarding the effects of these requirements on local law con-
cerning the adequacy of pleadings or pretrial demonstration of
genuine issues of fact."). Thus, even if section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third) were applicable here, Defendant bore the
burden of establishing the absence of any proof of a reasonable
alternative design. The Defendant failed to meet this burden.
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In this case, Plaintiff presented expert evidence of two
reasonable alternative designs for off-road mountain bike
suspension systems. One is an oil-based system and the other
is based on the Denver mountain bike design. The evidence on
the oil-based system was augmented by the fact that the
Defendant commonly used that system in other Cascade bikes.
Plaintiff additionally showed that the safety of Defendant's
design had been questioned on a number of occasions. Although
section 2(b) requires proof of a reasonable alternative design,
it does not limit evidence to a single design or even require
that the fact finder accept a design proffered by the Plaintiff.
Regardless of the source, all that is required to constitute a
prima facie case is some evidence of a reasonable alternative
design. Based on the evidence below, the district court was
correct in denying Defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment.
Defendant argues, however, that Plaintiffs evidence of a
reasonable alternative design is not enough. Defendant claims
that Plaintiff must also prove that the design will work, will
improve "overall safety," would be easy to maintain, would be
economically feasible, and will be accepted by consumers. In
a classic case of the law of unintended consequences, Defen-
dant would have this Court construe the Restatement (Third)
as a mighty barrier penetrable only by a massive array of
expert testimony. No such result was intended by the drafters.
In the first instance, proof of improvement in overall safety
is not required. Only a moment's thought shows why: Unless
the alleged defect goes to the very heart of the product's
function, a plaintiff probably could never prove improvement
in overall safety and, even then, probably could not meet that
burden in cases involving large, complex products. Component
parts cases, as with many others, would fail.
On a more basic level, however, the "overall safety" conten-
tion suffers from the same defect as the arguments concerning
the necessity of proof that the design will work or would be
easy to maintain. All are variations of contentions of impracti-
cability and are beside the point. In this case both designs are
in production and are actually used on off-road mountain bikes.
This fact creates at least an inference of practicability. Beyond
that, the Restatement (Third) makes clear that the Plaintiff
was not required to build a prototype, much less test one. See
Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. e. Not having to build or test a
prototype, Plaintiff cannot be required as a requisite to a prima
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facie case to make the kind of showing argued for by the
Defendant. To do so would in effect impose the very burden on
the Plaintiff that the Restatement (Third) states is not re-
quired. As the Restatement (Third) makes clear, the Plaintiff
should have the opportunity to conduct reasonable discovery
so as to ascertain whether an alternative design is practical.
See id.
Nor does it matter that the Denver design has been used
only on a small line of bikes marketed only in Colorado or that
Plaintiff did not present evidence that the Denver design could
be used in mass production. That argument misstates the
burden on summary judgment and, in any event, would not
support a summary judgment in light of the oil-based system
proof. More to the point, comment c to section 2 makes clear
that a product can be found defective even if the alternative
design had not been "adopted by any manufacturer, or even
considered for commercial use." See id. § 2 cmt. c. Thus,
whether the Denver bike production amounted to "mass
production" or was in any commercial use whatsoever is
immaterial and of no consequence.
Defendant also argues that the absence in Plaintiffs proofs
of a cost-benefit analysis renders his evidence of an alternative
design unreasonable as a matter of law. The Restatement
(Third) imposes no such qualification, see id. § 2 cmt. e, and
Defendant again has confused the burden on summary judg-
ment. As the Restatement (Third) makes clear, items such as
production costs and marketability are but part of a broad
range of factors that may, but are not required to be, consid-
ered on the subject of reasonableness. See id. Indeed, to graft
such a requirement on top of the reasonable alternative design
requirement would compound the unfairness already inherent
in section 2. That unfairness is at least partially recognized by
the acknowledgment of the difficulty and unfairness of requir-
ing such proof and the specific statement that, although the
fact finder might consider such evidence, it is not a required
element of the plaintiffs case. See id. Additionally, the mere
fact that an oil-based system would result in increased costs
of $75 per bike and that Cascade's market research indicates
consumers might be "reluctant" to buy at that price, does not
by itself as a matter of law mean the design was unreasonable.
See id.
Contrary to Defendant's argument, Plaintiff has not con-
tended that all mountain bikes must have a top-of-the-line
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suspension system or that the incorporation of a less costly,
steel spring suspension system in the Dirt Warrior necessarily
renders it unsafe for any use. Cascade was not required to put
suspension forks on the Dirt Warrior, nor was it required to
market a low-cost, off-road bike. Having elected, however, to
market a low-cost, off-road mountain bike with a suspension
system, Cascade had a duty to choose a suspension system
design that would work safely for the intended use. Plaintiffs
proof showed that Defendant failed to do so by choosing a steel
spring design that was unsafe for off-road, rough-trail riding
and whose safety had been questioned on a number of occa-
sions.5 Defendant's market research changes nothing. Although
consumers may recognize the limits of "lower-end, less-expen-
sive bikes," Defendant offered no evidence that users would in
any way have reason to believe that the Dirt Warrior suspen-
sion system would break while in normal use and cause serious
injury.
Finally, Defendant's argument-that when the fork "bot-
tomed out" Timmy was simply riding a suspensionless
bike-goes too far. When one spring broke, Timmy was not
riding a suspensionless bike but rather was confronted with
the completely unexpected, unanticipated situation of a par-
tially functioning fork with one of two springs operable and the
other broken. There was no evidence that such a condition was
a safe or reasonable design. Pointing this out only underscores
the unreasonably dangerous design of the Dirt Warrior.
5. The issue in this appeal concerns only the adequacy of the evidence to defeat
a motion for partial summary judgment on the design defect claim under section 2(b).
The suitability of Defendant's design for off-road, rough trail riding-just as any
argument about the appropriateness of Timmy's use of the bike-raises serious
questions concerning Cascade's instructions or warnings and potential liability under
section 2(c). Cascade obviously knew-or at least a fact finder could so find from the
evidence presented-that the Dirt Warrior bike would be used off-road and on rough
terrain. The Dirt Warrior is after all a "mountain bike." Given that use, Cascade's
Owners Manual only "suggests" that the bike not be used for "jumping." In light of
the evidence of the inadequacy of a steel spring system for such use, a proper
instruction or warning would have reduced the risk of harm. Under such circumstanc-
es, section 2(c) would preclude a summary judgment on the entire case.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs defective design claim was
properly denied.
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